Mass Nouns, Count Nouns and Non-Count Laycock – – In Alex Barber (ed.), Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics. Elsevier. A crucial part of Taurek’s argument is his contention that i. John M. Taurek, ” Should the Numbers Count?” Philosophy & Public Affairs 6, no. 4. (Summer I ). Oxford University Press USA publishes scholarly works in all academic disciplines, bibles, music, children’s books, business books, dictionaries, reference.
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If so, we obtain the outcome that it is worse if B and C die than if only A dies. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss this point in full, but advocates of the Standard Picture might be able to employ some sort of prioritarian or sufficientarian principle of prioritization, or some method of reflective equilibrium, none of which is necessarily consequentialist.
Call this the Broken Finger Objection. There are certainly other kinds of chance procedures a Numbers Partly Count proponent might wish to adopt for what Yoda ought to do in the Star Wars scenario, such as to choose whom to aid on the basis of a slightly different procedure where in round 2 given that A was chosen in round 1 Secura has a smaller chance of being aided given that Secura will receive more of the aid if chosen in comparison to B and C.
Once justice is taken into account, a nonconsequentialist may conclude that in this case, the consideration of justice should override the consideration based solely on numbers, and therefore we should not prosecute the innocent individual. hsould
John M. Taurek, Should the numbers count? – PhilPapers
In that case, accommodating this alleged fact could similarly be done by giving all four Jedi a chance of being aided. Saving lives, moral theory, and the claims of individuals. Submit a new link. However, consider the Argument from Best Outcome, the reasoning process of which is similar shoul the Kamm-Scanlon Argument. Instead, one could merely be making a decision to save someone, given that everyone is incommensurable, so that saving none at all is numbbers only thing one should not do.
Other things being equal, it seems that we should save B instead of A.
On the other hand, it is still true that all individuals have a chance of being saved, which accommodates the second alleged fact. For one of these persons, Susan, if she takes one pill then one of her arms will be restored; if shiuld takes two pills, then both of her arms will be restored; and, if conut takes three pills, then both of her arms and one of her legs will be restored. See also our discussion of philosophy and mental health issues here. Nevertheless, I do think that there is a viable way for the Numbers Partly Count proponent to deny that she ought to prefer iv over i.
Or, it might seem that they must embrace aggregation and thereby whole-sale consequentialism. Sanders takes the loss of a person to be bad simpliciter—not just bad for that person—such that this badness simpliciter is aggregative. However, the method of Pairwise Comparison also faces the Separateness of Persons Objection, because if persons are incommensurable, then surely one could not perform pairwise comparisons.
Taueek should be noted that Taurek goes on to say that “There may well come a point, however, at which the difference between what B stands to lose and C stands to lose is such that I would spare C his loss.
Star Wars is not an instance of a Taurek Scenario. I thus propose the following Star Wars scenario: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9: History of Western Philosophy. This article has no associated abstract. In particular, I argued that on the Standard Picture, what distinguishes nonconsequentialists from consequentialists is not that numbers and aggregation do not matter, but that they matter only as one input among many in a deliberative, practical reasoning process about tauurek a moral agent ought to do.
I’m not quite a fan of this piece because the author spends a great deal dealing with hypotheticals. However, if Spock were to fall into the lava, Spock would suffer more than Uhura if Uhura were to fall into the lava by a significant degree because Spock is half-Vulcan, and the burning of Vulcan flesh gives rise to more suffering by a significant degree in comparison to the suffering caused by the burning of human flesh.
Arguably, someone who holds the view that persons are incommensurable could argue that incommensurable values simply cannot be divided and proportioned. One would be required to save the one individual on this approach.
In this paper, I argued that pro-number nonconsequentialists may be making the tasks more difficult than necessary because on the Standard Picture of nonconsequentialism, a nonconsequentialist can allow aggregation and still respect the separateness of persons. Log In Sign Up. What We Owe to Each Other. Slurs, racism, and bigotry are absolutely not permitted.
Henry Laycock – – In Alex Barber ed. Saving A seems equivalent to saving B. I think it does. So, given PN we can abstract away from the numbers and just compare A alone to Secura.
But regardless, we have seen that there is certainly a viable way out of the inconsistency for the Numbers Partly Count proponent—a kind of numbers skeptic.
I think that Otsuka can establish this conclusion, but not by way of how he presents the argument. This helps keep discussion in the comments on topic and relevant to the linked material. In particular, why could someone not say that the point at which one should spare C his loss is precisely when C is in a larger group than B, and that even if the choice were Bs he too should prefer that C be spare his loss, shoule is, the greater number should be saved?
John M. Taurek: Should the Numbers Count?
Moreover, unlike a sizable portion of the debate between Taurek and his opponents, the Otsuka 2. Round 2 given that Secura was chosen in round 1: The Morality of Freedom. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 3: The chosen Jedi receives one pill. But, setting aside the fact that some philosophers actually embrace taurfk implications of aggregation, which suggests that these implications are not obviously wrong, it is not necessary for nonconsequentialists to reject aggregation in order to avoid these implications.
Saving the greater number without combining claims.