ADAMS, ROBERT. “Theories of actuality.”. Noûs, Vol. 8 (), pp. – CrossRef. CASTANEDA, HECTOR-NERI. “Individuation and. In this essay, I defend the compatibility of actualism – i.e., the view that there neither are, nor could have been, any nonexistent objects – and possible worlds. It has been argued that actualism – the view that there are no non-actual objects and nestedmodal operators require stipulation of nested possible worlds.

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Please, subscribe or login to access all content. Finally, I provide an actualist understanding of propositions such as there could have an object distinct from each object that actually exists — an understanding that does not commit one to belief in nonexistent objects. An important, but significantly different notion of possibilism known as modal realism was developed by the philosopher David Lewis.

This page was last edited on 12 Octoberat This article has no associated abstract. Donnellan – – Philosophical Review 83 1: Print Save Cite Email Share.

Actualism and Possible Worlds

Chad Carmichael – – Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 2: Classical, Early, and Medieval Poetry and Poets: Science Logic and Mathematics. If you think you should acualism access to this title, please contact your librarian.

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Alvin Plantinga, Actualism and possible worlds – PhilPapers

Actuality is an intrinsic property of each world, so world w is actual just at world w. Richard Montague – – In Richmond H. Sign in Create an account. We can now define several critical notions: Gabriele Contessa – worldss Synthese 3: In this essay, I defend the compatibility of actualism — i. Philosophical Studies 2: Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality Author s: Added to PP index Total downloads 10, of 2, Recent downloads 6 months 24 18, of 2, How can I increase my downloads?

Towards a Proper Treatment of Quantification in English.

That the latter distinction is more intelligible than the former ones is often just assumed by the actualist without argument. Jeff Speaks – – Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 3: So far, no possible-but-nonactual objects have been introduced for the analysis of modal claims.

Views Read Edit View history. To troubleshoot, please check our FAQsand if you can’t find the answer there, please contact us. The denial of actualism is possibilismthe thesis that there are some entities that are merely possible: Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality. The actualist argues, instead, that when we claim “possible worlds” exist we are making claims that things exist in our own actual world which can serve as possible worlds for the interpretation of modal claims: Alvin Plantinga University of Notre Dame.

Actualism and Higher-Order Worlds.

In contemporary analytic philosophyactualism is the view that everything there is i. In particular, I deny that properties are set theoretical entities; aftualism that the Canonical Conception endorses. Other possible worlds exist in exactly the same sense as the actual world; they are simply spatio-temporally unrelated to our world, and to each other.


Find it on Scholar. Christopher Menzel – – Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

This invites the question whether there are cogent arguments for this assumption. Civil War American History: This step is, therefore, consistent with Thesis A. Search my Subject Specializations: For the philosophy of Giovanni Gentile, often called actualism, see Actual idealism.

In particular, I deny that properties are set theoretical entities; something that the Canonical Conception endorses.

Actualism > An Account of Abstract Possible Worlds (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Hence, for Lewis, “merely possible” entities—entities that exist in other possible worlds—exist in exactly the same sense as do we in the actual world; to be actual, from the perspective of any given individual x in any possible world, is simply to be part of the same world as x.

All All Atualism Author Keyword. If there are no Aliens, then no such world obtains.